Legal Malpractice—Expansion of the Standard of Care: Duty to Refer—Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979) by Feyerherm, Karen J.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 56 Number 3 
7-1-1981 
Legal Malpractice—Expansion of the Standard of Care: Duty to 
Refer—Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 
(1979) 
Karen J. Feyerherm 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karen J. Feyerherm, Recent Developments, Legal Malpractice—Expansion of the Standard of Care: Duty to 
Refer—Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979), 56 Wash. L. Rev. 505 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol56/iss3/10 
This Recent Developments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
LEGAL MALPRACTICE-EXPANSION OF THE STANDARD OF CARE: DUTY
TO REFER-Horne v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr.
714(1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Home v. Peckham an action in malpractice was brought against at-
torney Jordan Peckham in connection with drafting documents to estab-
lish a "Clifford trust." 1 A jury awarded plaintiffs Roy and Doris Home
$64,983.31,2 and a California district court of appeal affirmed. 3 In af-
firming, the court of appeal held that the trial court correctly instructed
the jury that it is malpractice for an attorney not to refer his client to a
specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably diligent general practi-
tioner would do so. 4
1. Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
The Clifford trust derived its name from the 1940 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). In Clifford, a husband established a five year trust with certain securi-
ties serving as the corpus. He declared himself trustee and his wife beneficiary. Although the wife
was to receive the income accruing during the five year period, the husband retained the right to
accumulate income as well as complete control over the corpus of the trust. The Clifford Court held
that "the short duration of the trust, the fact that the wife was the beneficiary, and the retention of
control over the corpus by respondent all lead irresistibly to the conclusion that respondent continued
to be the owner for purposes of § 22(a) [now I.R.C. § 61(a), defining gross income]." Id. at 335.
To a large extent, the so-called "Clifford rules" were incorporated into the Internal Revenue Code
(I.R.C.) of 1954. I.R.C. §§ 673-675, 678. A taxpayer may not avoid taxes by assigning income to
an individual in a lower tax bracket (e.g., the taxpayer's child or parent). According to the Clifford
rules and the I.R.C. provisions, she may, however, transfer tax liability by placing "income-produc-
ing property" into a trust for at least 10 years. J. STANLEY & R. KILCujLLEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX
LAw 280-83 (6th ed. 1974). The "trust income is then taxable to the beneficiary who frequently pays
no taxes at all because of the increased personal exemptions and low-income allowances." Id. at 281.
See also M. CHtRELsrEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, §§ 8.04-9.01 (2d ed. 1979).
2. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 407, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 715. Apparently, damages were largely based on the
additional income tax the plaintiffs were required to pay when the IRS determined that tax liability
had not been transferred by the Clifford trust. See Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 1, Home v.
Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979). Defendant Peckham petitioned for
rehearing on the ground that "increased income tax liability cannot constitute compensable dam-
ages." Id. To support this proposition, Peckham quoted from Daly v. Kling, 2 Civ. No. 56075 (Cal.
2d App. Dist., August 23, 1979), which was decided approximately one month after the Home court
affirmed the trial court's decision: "[Although a financial gain caused by a wrongdoer may result in
a tax liability to the person who sustained the gain, the amount of the tax liability does not enhance or
increase the damages for which the wrongdoer is liable." Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 1,
Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979) (quoting Daly) (emphasis in
original). Peckham's petition for rehearing was denied. 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr.714
(1979).
Costs of suit in the amount of $3,595.17 were also assessed against Peckham, bringing the total
damage award, including appropriate interest, to $90,921.15, as of May 5, 1977. Respondent's
Reply Brief at 1-2, Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
3. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 418, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
4. Id. at 414-15, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720. Furthermore, the Horne court held, inter alia, that there
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The circumstances underlying this malpractice action began in 1967
when plaintiff Home went to attorney Peckham and asked him to estab-
lish a Clifford trust. 5 Peckham testified that he told the plaintiff he "had
no expertise in tax matters . . . [but] if somebody else could figure out
what needed to be done, [he] could draft the documents." 6 Peckham con-
sulted briefly with Thomas McIntosh, 7 an alleged tax expert, 8 concerning
the trust. Following this consultation, Peckham proceeded to draft the
trust documents9 without researching the tax consequences of the contem-
was evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that Peckham committed malpractice by
failing to conduct adequate research. See note 10 and accompanying text infra.
5. Id. at 407, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716. See generally note I supra (definition of Clifford trust).
Originally, a patent, with a ten year remaining life, for production of a wood product called "Per-
fect Plank Plus" was to serve as the corpus of the contemplated trust. Id. (A patent provides protec-
tion for seventeen years, allowing an inventor to "exclude others from making, using, or selling the
invention throughout the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976)). Later, plaintiff asked Peckham if
a five year, non-exclusive license of the patent rights, rather than the patent itself, could be put into
the trust. The license permitted the corporation to produce Perfect Plank Plus for two years with an
option to renew for three additional years in exchange for royalties. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 407-08, 158
Cal. Rptr. at 716. Attorney Peckham testified that he told Home he did not know whether the license
could effectively be put into the trust, but that he would discuss it with a tax expert. See notes 7 & 8
and accompanying text infra.
6. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 407, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
7. Peckham talked to McIntosh, an attorney and certified public accountant, about the contem-
plated trust during a meeting arranged by the Homes' accountant, Herbert McClanahan, to discuss
the future of the Homes' company. Id. at 407-08, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716. According to Peckham's
testimony, he asked whether the license, instead of the patent, could effectively be put into the trust
and received an affirmative answer. Id. at 408, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (Peckham and McIntosh, how-
ever, disagreed on whether the subject of license versus patent arose at the meeting). See note 5 supra
(discussion of the licensing arrangement).
8. The Homes' accountant recommended McIntosh to Peckham as "an expert in deferred com-
pensation and profit-sharing plans." Id. at 408, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716. Peckham had no knowledge
that McIntosh had, at the time Peckham consulted with him, practiced law for less than one year. Id.
The Home court did not have to decide whether Peckham had been negligent in consulting with an
attorney who had practiced law less than one year, because Peckham asserted simply that he had no
duty to refer or to recommend the assistance of a specialist. Peckham did not argue that he had met
this duty by consulting with McIntosh. Id. at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720. For a judicial discussion of
the liability for negligent referral to another general practitioner, see Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F.
Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975). In Torino, the client retained a New York lawyer to handle a personal
injury claim, and the attorney referred the client to an attorney in New Jersey, where the client had
sustained the injury. The referring attorney was not aware that the New Jersey attorney had been
indicted for fraud, as his only investigation of the attorney's qualifications had been to consult a legal
directory and determine that the New Jersey attorney was a licensed practitioner. "The court con-
cluded that no further factual investigation need be made since the New York attorney could safely
rely upon the determination of New Jersey that by licensing an attorney, he was presumptively fit and
competent to practice law." R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 220 (1977) (citing
Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975)).
9. The three documents included: (1) an irrevocable trust agreement to terminate in 12 years
(1979), with the Homes and two others as trustees and the Homes' three sons as beneficiaries; (2) a
five year license agreement between Home and his incorporated business, Perfect Plank; and (3) an
assignment to the trust of the rights under the license agreement. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 408-09, 158
Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
Duty to Refer
plated trust. 10 Peckham sent the completed documents to the Homes' ac-
countant for approval."l
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited the Homes' tax returns in
197012 and determined that the trust did not effectively transfer tax liabil-
ity. 13 Consequently, the IRS assessed a tax deficiency against the
Homes. 14 After unsuccessfully challenging the assessment at the first ad-
ministrative level, the Homes acknowledged tax liability. 15 The malprac-
tice action against Peckham was commenced in 1972.16
This note analyzes the Home court's reasoning in expanding the stan-
dard of care in legal malpractice actions to include a duty to refer and in
holding attorneys to the same standard of care as physicians. This note
also evaluates the considerations relevant to distinguishing "specialist"
cases from "generalist" cases and the need for expert testimony in deter-
mining liability for failure to refer.
II. BACKGROUND: LEGAL MALPRACTICE
Under the English common law, an attorney had an obligation to ren-
der legal services commensurate with his professed competence in his
"calling." A breach of that obligation resulted in liability for damages
10. According to Peckham's testimony, McClanahan, the Homes' accountant, "had provided
him with '. . . a couple of pages of translucencies . . . governing Clifford Trusts,' and he also
consulted the two-volume annual set of American Jurisprudence on federal taxation, which included
a discussion of Clifford Trusts; he otherwise relied on McClanahan's judgment." Id. at 407, 158 Cal.
Rptr. at716.
The Home court rejected Peckham's argument that "[i]t is not legal malpractice (negligence) on "
the part of an attorney general practitioner to draw documents without doing research on a point of
law on which there is no appellate decision or statute in point." Id. at 409, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 717. In
rejecting this argument the court concluded:
The argument has two parts; first, that the trust documents were in fact valid as a tax shelter,
second, that even if invalid, their invalidity is so debatable that he should not be liable for
making an error regarding a matter about which reasonable attorneys can disagree. He is wrong
on both points. The documents are invalid for their intended purpose, and the invalidity is rather
obvious. To demonstrate this, one need go no further than the original Clifford case [Helvering
v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940)], from which the name "Clifford Trust" is derived, and the
legislation it brought about.
Id.
A discussion of the Home court's analysis of the trust's validity and assignment of income is
beyond the scope of this casenote.
11. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
12. Royalties from the license (see note 5 supra) were paid into the trust until the 1970 audit. Id.




16. Id. Peckham cross-complained against McIntosh for indemnity in 1973. The jury found in
favor of McIntosh. Id.
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proximately caused by the attorney's negligence. 17 The modem malprac-
tice action evolved from that rationale. 18
The elements of a legal malpractice action are fundamentally the same
as those necessary to establish a prima facie case of ordinary, nonprofes-
sional negligence: a breach of a duty to the plaintiff' 9 that is the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. 20
17. Russell v. Palmer, 2 Wils. K.B. 325, 95 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B. 1767); Pitt v. Yalden. 4 Burr.
2060, 98 Eng. Rep. 74 (K.B. 1767). The development of legal malpractice in the United States began
with the decision in Stephens v. White, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 203 (1796). In rejecting defendant attorney's
argument that he owed his client no duty, because the client had not compensated him for his ser-
vices, the Stephens court stated: "ITihe appellee undertook to conduct the suit, and in his manage-
ment of it, was guilty of such a neglect of his duty as to subject the plaintiff to a loss; after this, it is
not competent to him to alledge a want of consideration." Id. at 210 (emphasis in original). For a
detailed discussion of the genesis of legal malpractice, see Wade, The Attorney's Liabilityfor Negli-
gence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959).
18. When a person adopts the legal profession, and assumes to exercise its duties in behalf of
another for hire, he must be understood as promising to employ a reasonable degree of care and
skill in the performance of such duties; and if injury results to the client from a want of such a
degree of reasonable care and skill, the attorney may be held to respond in damages to the extent
of the injury sustained. Proof of employment and the want of reasonable care and skill are pre-
requisites to the maintenance of the action; but it must not be understood that an attorney is liable
for every mistake that may occur in practice, or that he may be held responsible to his client for
every error of judgment in the conduct of his client's cause. Instead of that, the rule is that if he
acts with a proper degree of skill, and with reasonable care and to the best of his knowledge, he
will not be held responsible.
Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 198 (1879). See also Student Symposium: Legal Malpractice,
14 HAWAII B.J. 3, 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Student Symposium]; notes 19-26 and accompanying
text infra.
19. The duty owed by an attorney usually arises from the attorney-client relationship. See Ber-
man v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 849, 227 S.E.2d 802, 806 (1976). See also Student Symposium, supra
note 18, at 8. Once an attorney assumes the responsibility to render professional services, a duty
arises regardless of whether or not there exists a valid contract supported by consideration. See
Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975); Glenn v. Haynes, 191 Va. 574, 66 S.E.2d
509 (1951). No duty arises, however, unless the attorney undertakes to render services in a profes-
sional capacity. Thus, an attorney giving free legal advice to a friend usually does not owe a duty. See
McGregor v. Wright, 117 Cal. App. 186, 3 P.2d 624 (1931). But see Grudberg v. Midvale Realty
Co., 119 Misc. 558, 195 N.Y.S. 760 (App. Term 1922) (dictum).
Traditionally, an attorney has been obligated only to his client. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100
U.S. 195, 199-200 (1879). In an effort to diminish the harshness of the privity requirement, the
California Supreme Court in Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962), permitted the beneficiaries under a will to bring an
action against the attorney who prepared it. "[The main purpose of the testator in making his agree-
ment with the attorney is to benefit the persons named in his will and this intent can be effectuated, in
the event of a breach by the attorney, only by giving the beneficiaries a right of action .... " For a
discussion of the holding in Lucas v. Hamm, see note 30 infra. See also Lowall v. Groman. 180 Pa.
532, 37 A. 98 (1897).
20. See, e.g., Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Collins v.
Slocum, 317 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 1975); Thompson v. Erving's Hatcheries, Inc., 186 So. 2d 756
(Miss. 1966). In those situations involving only one causal factor, the courts have traditionally ap-
plied the "but for" rule. See Hampel-Lawson Mercantile Co. v. Poe, 169 Ark. 840, 277 S.W. 29
(1925) (mortgage filed in wrong county); McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A. 102
Duty to Refer
The duty an attorney owes a client is expressed in terms of the applica-
ble standard of care-the "minimum gauge" of an attorney's actions. 21
Traditionally, the standard of care has been based on the degree of knowl-
edge, skill, and diligence exercised by lawyers of ordinary ability and
prudence. 22 Application of this standard generally results in liability for
procedural errors,23 fundamental errors of law, 24 and errors in preparing
(1926) (defective chattel mortgage). These situations present no problem in determining that the at-
torney's negligent actions were the "sole cause" of the client's loss when he unsuccessfully at-
tempted to enforce the mortgages. The "but for" rule, however, proves inadequate when there is
more than one causal factor. See generally W. PRossai, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 28 (4th
ed. 1971). In those situations involving two concurrent causes, or one negligent act followed by a
second negligent act, the courts have implemented (1) the "substantial factor" test (Modica v. Crist,
129 Cal. App. 2d 144, 146, 276 P.2d 614, 617 (1954) ("The defendant's conduct is a cause of the
event if it was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.") (quoting Prosser,
Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REv. 369, 378 (1950)); or (2) the "independent interven-
ing cause" test (Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wn. 2d 581, 584, 328 P.2d 164, 166 (1958) (intervening event
that could reasonably have been anticipated by the wrongdoer did not break the chain of causation)).
21. Note, Standard of Care in Legal Malpractice, 43 IND. L.J. 771,772 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Standard of Care]. See also Houser, Legal Malpractice-An Overview, 55 N.D.L. REv. 185, 195
(1979).
22. Although there are a variety of articulations of the standard of care applicable in legal mal-
practice actions (see Student Symposium, supra note 18, at 5 n.18; Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1294-95 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Malpractice)), the formulation
of the standard most often quoted is that found in Hodges v. Carter:
Ordinarily when an attorney engages in the practice of the law and contracts to prosecute an
action in behalf of his client, he impliedly represents that (1) he possesses the requisite degree of
learning, skill, and ability necessary to the practice of his profession and which others similarly
situated ordinarily possess; (2) he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution of the litigation
entrusted to him; and (3) he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of
his skill and in the applicationpf his knowledge to his client's cause.
239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144, 145-46 (1954).
Some courts have held that liability for malpractice arises in contract, rather than in tort. See In re
Estate of Kruger, 130 Cal. 621, 63 P. 31 (1900); Lindner v. Eichel, 34 Misc. 2d 840, 232 N.Y.S. 2d
240, aff'd mem., 17 A.D.2d 735, 233 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1960). In applying this contractual theory of
malpractice liability, some courts have found that by undertaking to render professional services, the
attorney impliedly agrees to exercise a reasonable degree of care and diligence. See Ventura County
Humane Soc'y v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 903, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464, 468 (1974). See also
Wade, supra note 17, at 762-65. Characterization of the underlying theory as either contract or tort,
however, does not alter the applicable standard of care. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d
685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
The standard of care often takes "locality" into consideration. E.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d
349, 355 n.3, 360, 530 P.2d 589, 592 n.3, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 n.3, 628 (1975) (standard of
attorney in same or similar locality); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966)
(degree of care customarily exercised by attorneys in El Paso County, Texas); Hansen v. Wightman,
14 Wn. App. 78, 90, 538 P.2d 1238, 1247 (1975) (standard of reasonably prudent attorney in State of
Washington).
23. Williams v. Bashman, 457 F. Supp. 322, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (failure to file personal injury
claim within statute of limitations); Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864,
866-67 (1961) (failure to register or advise client to register chattel mortgage). See also Student
Symposium, supra note 18, at 6-7; Attorney Malpractice, supra note 22, at 1294-95.
24. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Keown, 451 F. Supp. 397, 402 (D.N.J. 1978) ("securities" er-
509
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documents.25 Attorneys are required to understand the elementary princi-
ples of law and to find those additional principles discoverable through
"standard research techniques." ' 26 No liability, however, is ordinarily
imposed for errors of judgment. 27
Expansion of the standard of care to include a duty, on the part of a
general practitioner, to consult with or refer to a legal specialist was
foreshadowed by the development of de facto specialization in the legal
profession. 28 Imposition of the duty to refer was also presaged by indica-
tions that doctrines developed in medical malpractice actions may be
equally applicable in the context of legal malpractice. 29
roneously interpreted to include real estate). See also Student Symposium, supra note 18, at 6-7:
Attorney Malpractice, supra note 22, at 1298-300.
25. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (failure to assert
client's community interest in her husband's retirement fund in divorce decree); McCullough v. Sulli-
van, 102 N.J.L. 381, 132 A. 102, 103-04 (1926) (failing to state "true consideration" pursuant to
chattel mortgage statute); Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 174, 288 P. 265. 268 (1930)
(permitting legatee to witness will). See also Student Sympostum, supra note 18, at 6-7; Attorney
Malpractice, supra note 22, at 1296-98.
26. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 359, 530 P.2d 589, 595, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621. 627 (1975).
See Berman v. Rubin, 138 Ga. App. 839, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1976). For an early judicial discus-
sion of an attorney's duty to research, see Citizens' Loan, Fund & Sav. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind.
143, 23 N.E. 1075, 1075-76 (1890).
27. E.g., Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 308, 578 P.2d 935, 938, 146 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222
(1978); Cook v. Clausing, 73 Wn. 2d 393, 394-95, 438 P.2d 865, 866 (1968). See also Student
Symposium, supra note 18, at 6. Cf. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 359, 530 P.2d 589, 595, 118
Cal. Rptr. 621, 627 (1975) ("[A]n attorney does not ordinarily guarantee the soundness of his opin-
ions and, accordingly, is not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice. He is expected.
however, to possess knowledge of those plain and elementary principles of law which are commonly
known by well informed attorneys .... ").
28. "Specialization is significant only in the context of the standard of care." R. MALLEN & V.
LEVIT, supra note 8, at 175. Recognition of specialization usually results in an alteration of the stan-
dard of care applicable to general practitioners as well as specialists. For example, medical practition-
ers have been found liable for malpractice if they fail to refer patients to specialists when a need for
specialized treatment is apparent. Seneris v. Hass, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955): Benson v.
Dean, 232 N.Y. 52, 133 N.E. 125 (1921). See King v. Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969) (revers-
ing a summary judgment for defendant general practitioner). See generally McCoid. The Care Re-
quired of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 597 (1959); Student Symposium, supra note
18, at 20; Comment, Specialization: The Resulting Standard of Care and Duty to Consult, 30 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 729, 737 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Resulting Standard of Care]: Anornev Malpractice
supra note 22, at 1304.
29. Attorneys are very properly held to the same rule of liability for want of professional skill
and diligence in practice, and for erroneous or negligent advice to those who employ them. as
are physicians and surgeons, and other persons who hold themselves out to the world as possess-
ing skill and qualification in their respective trades or professions.
Citizens' Loan, Fund & Sav. Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 23 N.E. 1075, 1075 (1890). Accord,
Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864, 866 (1961); Slade v. Harris, 105 Conn.
436, 135 A. 570, 572 (1927); Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App. 457 (1934); Cook v. Irion, 409 S.W.2d
475, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). See generally Schnidman & Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Di-
lemma: Will New Standards of Care Place Professional Liabili, Insurance Beyond the Reach of the
Specialist?, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 541,548 (1976); Zelle & Stanhope. Lawyer Malpractice: The Boom-
510
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Prior to Home v. Peckham, the courts were, nevertheless, reluctant to
extend the duty to refer to attorneys. 30 This reluctance was, in part, attrib-
erang Principle, 13 TRIAL 16 (1977). For a case discussing the physician's duty to refer, see King v.
Flamm, 442 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1969).
Although medical specialists are held to a higher standard of care than the general practitioner, the
courts have not generally imposed a similar standard on legal specialists. Nevertheless, in Wright v.
Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975), the California Supreme Court indicated
that an attorney who holds himself out as a specialist in maritime law may be held to a higher standard
of care:
One who holds himself out as a legal specialist performs in similar circumstances to other spe-
cialists but not to general practitioners of the law. We thus conclude that a lawyer holding him-
self out to the public and the profession as specializing in an area of the law must exercise the
skill, prudence, and diligence exercised by other specialists of ordinary skill and capacity spe-
cializing in the same field.
Id. at 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
30. The only judicial statement prior to Home v. Peckham suggesting that an attorney has a duty
to refer or consult-in the malpractice context-was found in the intermediate appellate court's
opinion in Lucas v. Hamm, 11 Cal. Rptr. 727, 731 (1961):
Mhe law today has its specialties, and even as the general practitioner in medicine must seek
the aid of the specialist in his profession, so the general practitioner in law, when faced with a
problem beyond his capabilities, must turn to the expert in his profession to the end that his
client is properly served.
The California Supreme Court vacated on other grounds without discussing the duty to consult. 56
Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). For a
critical analysis of the California Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. Hamm,, see Note, 81 L.Q.
REv. 478, 481 (1965) ("The standard of competence in California thus seems to be that it is not
negligent for lawyers to draft wills knowing little or nothing of the rule against perpetuities, and
without consulting anyone skilled in the rule .... ). As one commentator observed, "Notwithstand-
ing their frequent statements that attorneys occupy a position with respect to those they serve similar
if not identical to that of members of the medical profession, the courts have treated attorney malprac-
tice suits as sui generis." Attorney Malpractice, supra note 22, at 1311-12.
In the context of professional discipline, as opposed to professional malpractice, attorneys have
been held to a standard that specifically includes a duty to "associate." Disciplinary actions are
governed by state-adopted rules, which are based on the ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONStBILITY [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE] in every state but California. Wolfram, Barriers to
Effective Public Participation in Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 632
(1978); see ABA STANDING COMM. ON ETHics AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CODE OF PROFES-
SIOGNAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE 1 (1977). Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(I) of the current version of
the Model Code provides: "A lawyer shall not: (1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should
know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to
handle it." In Florida Bar v. Gallagher, 366 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1978), the respondent attorney entered
a conditional plea of guilty for admittedly violating, inter alia, DR 6-101(A)(l) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility of the Florida Bar by accepting a maritime personal injury case with
knowledge that he was not competent to handle the case. California recently adopted a rule that
parallels ABA CODE DR 6-101(A)(1):
A member of the State Bar shall not wilfully or habitually
(1) Perform legal services for a client . . . if he knows . . . that he does not possess the
learning and skill ordinarily possessed by lawyers in good standing who perform, but do not
specialize in, similar services ... unless he associates or ... consults another lawyer who he
reasonably believes does possess the requisite learning and skill ...
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West Supp. 1980) (Rule 6-101). See Flynn, Webster & Swartz,
Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility in California, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 603 (1975). See also
note 70 infra.
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utable to underlying differences between the two professions and a gen-
eral presumption that all lawyers are capable of handling all legal mat-
ters.31 The presumption that lawyers have the capacity for omni-
competence, however, is being eroded by the ever increasing complexity
of the law. 32
Paralleling the growing complexity of the law are the demand for more
competent professional services 33 and the resulting increase in malprac-
tice litigation. 34 In view of these progressions, the expansion of the stan-
dard of care to include a specific duty to refer represents a significant
development in the area of legal malpractice.
III. THE HORNE COURT'S REASONING
Defendant Peckham contended that an attorney who is a general practi-
tioner has no duty to refer a client to a specialist. 35 Peckham alleged that
it was therefore reversible error for the trial court to have given the jury an
instruction imposing a duty to refer. 36 The allegedly erroneous instruc-
tion, ordinarily given in medical malpractice cases,37 stated that a general
31. See Schnidman & Salzler, supra note 29, at 548:
The reluctance of courts to extend the duty to consult to the legal profession stems from a
belief that all attorneys are competent to handle all legal matters. Today, this presumption,
coupled with the complexity of the law, is highly tenuous. It is obvious, for example, that the
general practitioner does not possess detailed knowledge of the intricacies and exceptions of
federal taxation law, securities regulation, or antitrust law. When presented with such problems.
it therefore would seem incumbent upon the general practitioner to refer his clients to attorneys
possessing the requisite knowledge.
32. See Cheatham, The Growing Need for Specialized Legal Services, 16 VAND. L. REV. 197
(1963); Resulting Standard of Care, supra note 28, at 737.
33. See Schnidman & Salzler, supra note 29, at 541: "The relatively secure domain of the pro-
fessional in our society recently has been jeopardized by increased attacks upon his competence. His
once favored position gradually is being undermined by unyielding public demand for unparalleled
competency and efficiency."
It has been suggested that "[miore competent clients are demanding more competent legal assis-
tance." Petrey, Professional Competence and Legal Specialization, 50 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 561. 561
(1976).
Lawyers are facing a new phenomenon: more competent clients. American citizens are be-
coming better educated consumers and are demanding more information about the services they
buy. They also are recognizing, more than ever before, the growing need for effective legal
advice and representation in a complicated society where redemption of legal rights and benefits
is a regular event for nearly everyone, rich and poor alike.
Id. See Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 281 (1973).
34. See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra note 6, at § 6 (including graphs depicting the relative
frequency of legal malpractice actions in the United States from 1799 to 1979 and the relative fre-
quency of malpractice actions by state during 1900-1976 and during 1960-1976).






practitioner has a duty to refer a client to a specialist, or to recommend a
specialist's assistance, if a reasonably prudent attorney would have done
so under similar circumstances. 38 The applicability of the instruction to
legal malpractice presented "an issue of first impression." 39
In approving the jury instruction, the Home court rejected Peckham's
contention that, since California did not officially recognize specialists
until 1973, an attorney could not have had a duty to refer in 1967.40 De-
spite the absence of official recognition, the court concluded that legal
specialists did exist in 1967.41 To support this conclusion, the court cited
a 1968 California survey, revealing that two-thirds of all California attor-
neys had "limited their practice to a very few areas, frequently to one
only. ',42
Furthermore, the court reasoned, taxation was one of the first areas to
be recognized as a legal specialty in California 43 and elsewhere. 44 The
court noted that defendant Peckham himself admitted that tax specialists
existed in 1967 when he advised his client that he was not a tax expert.45
Acknowledging that the existence of a specialty does not require referral
to a specialist in every case, the Home court remarked: "Many tax mat-
ters are so generally known that they can well be handled by general prac-
titioners. "'46
Having thus reasoned that tax specialists did exist in 1967 and that
Peckham himself recognized his need for expert assistance, the Home
38. The instruction given to the jury stated:
It is the duty of an attorney who is a general practitioner to refer his client to a specialist or
recommend the assistance of a specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably careful and
skillful practitioner would do so.
If he fails to perform that duty and undertakes to perform professional services without the aid
of a specialist, it is his further duty to have the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed, and
exercise the care and skill ordinarily used by specialists in good standing in the same or similar
locality and under the same circumstances.
A failure to perform any such duty is negligence.
Id. at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
39. Id. at 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
40. Id. at414-15, 158 Cal. Rptr. at720.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720, citing Committee on Specialization, Results of Survey on
Certification of Specialists, 44 J. ST. B. CAL. 140, 143 (1969).
43. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (taxation one of first three recognized speciali-
ties in California) (citing Casey, Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 549,
555 (1976)).
44. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 414-15, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720, citing R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note
8, at 368.




court held that it was not reversible error for this trial court to have given
the "medical malpractice" instruction. 47
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
A. Recognition of De Facto Specialization
The court's first step in approving the jury instruction ordinarily given
only in medical malpractice cases was recognition of de facto specializa-
tion.48 Peckham asserted that he owed no duty because his conduct
should be judged according to the law as it existed in 1967-before spe-
cialists were officially recognized in California. 49 Although Peckham's
assertion was correct, 50 he incorrectly assumed that the lack of official
recognition was conclusive in determining whether or not there were spe-
cialists to whom he could have referred his client. The court accurately
characterized the debate over whether specialists existed as "academic"
because many lawyers did in fact specialize. 5' The existence of special-
ists in 1967, however, did not ipso facto create a corresponding duty to
refer. 52
B. Analogy to Medical Profession
The second step in the court's reasoning should have been a critical
evaluation of the similarities and differences between the medical and
legal professions. Instead, the court concluded, without explaining its ra-
tionale, that the attorney's standard of care with respect to referral is
identical to that of the physician. 53
Prior to Home v. Peckham, courts were reluctant to apply the stricter
standards of care developed in medical malpractice to legal malpractice
47. Id.
48. See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
49. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
50. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. App. 3d 349, 356, 530 P.2d 589, 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 625
(1975) ("We cannot, however, evaluate the quality of defendant's professional services on the basis
of the law as it appears today. ").
51. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (citing R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 8,
at 172 ("The reality is that many attorneys have become specialists")). See Resulting Standard of
Care, supra note 28, at 729 ("Whether recognized officially or unofficially by a state bar, specializa-
tion has always existed within the legal profession and is certain to become the public's primary
means of assessing the qualifications of a legal representative.") (footnote omitted).
52. See 97 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720; note 68 and accompanying text infra.
53. The court's conclusion that attorneys and physicians owe the same duty to refer was implicit
in the court's approval of the jury instruction ordinarily given only in medical malpractice cases. 97




actions. 54 This reluctance was attributable, at least in part, to differences
between the two professions. 55 First, attorneys are rarely confronted with
life and death situations, such as physicians often encounter. 56 Second,
attorneys have not generally undergone additional training, as have medi-
cal specialists. 57 Finally, and most significantly to Home v. Peckham,
attorneys traditionally have not been certified to practice in specialized
areas. 58
As a result of medicine's highly developed board certification pro-
grams,59 a physician who recognizes a need to refer to a specialist is bet-
ter able to select a qualified specialist with a particular expertise. 60 Be-
cause board certification in medicine is widespread and well-
established, 61 medical specialists are known to their colleagues by their
certified area of expertise. 62
In most states, 63 general practitioners in law, recognizing a similar
54. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
55. See Resulting Standard of Care, supra note 28, at 735-36; Standard of Care, supra note 21,
at 786.
56. Nonetheless, as one commentator observed, "an attorney can not only considerably affect
the economic quality of life, but a criminal specialist is quite often involved in life or death deci-
sions." Resulting Standard of Care, supra note 28, at 736.
57. See generally Stall & Baer, Legal Versus Medical Training, or Are Lawyers and Their Cli-
ents Missing Out?, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 568 (1977).
58. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 8, at 33-36.
59. Medicine with its highly developed system of certification is a striking analogy. In 1959 it
had examining and certifying boards in nineteen specialties, which over the preceding eighteen
years had granted 77,447 certificates of proficiency. There was no hasty growth of certification.
The first board was created in 1915, the second nine years later in 1924, and most originated in
the 1930's. So the system, growing slowly at first, developed only after its usefulness was
proven. There are criticisms of the operation of the system and warnings lest the specialist be-
come a mere narrow technician. There is no thought, however, of abolishing specialties and of
returning to a system under which all physicians would be general practitioners. While medicine
is a striking analogy, it may not be a close one. Medicine and law differ greatly in the develop-
ment and precision of the underlying sciences, in the facilities for post-graduate work under
supervision, and in the methods of practice. It would be impossible to transfer the system of
medical certification to law, and law must work out its own system.
Cheatham, supra note 32, at 502 (footnotes omitted).
60. For example, a physician general practitioner could consult the Directory of Medical Special-
ists to locate a board certified specialist (with a particular expertise). See AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDI-
CAL SPECIALTIES, DIRECTORY OF MEDICAL SPECILISTS (1979-1980). Additionally, a general practi-
tioner in medicine may consult this directory to verify the certification of a specialist whose name was
given to him by a colleague. No such directory is available to attorneys. But see note 64 infra.
61. See note 59 supra.
62. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
63. By June 1980, only ten states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada,
New York, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington) had adopted and implemented board certifica-
tion programs. ABA STANDING COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BuLLETIN No. 7, at 36-42
(1980). For a description of board certification in California, see note 66 infra. Nine states (Alabama,
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, and New Mexico) had adopted
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need to refer to a specialist, would have to rely primarily on rumored
reputation to select a qualified attorney with a particular expertise. 64
One can criticize Peckham for creating a Clifford trust when he admit-
tedly doubted his own competence to do so. 65 Nonetheless, one can also
appreciate the difficulty he would have encountered if he had tried to refer
his client to a competent tax expert in 1967.66 In the absence of any certi-
fication program, there was no guarantee that an attorney who had a repu-
tation as a tax attorney was actually competent in that field.
If attorneys are held to a standard of care that includes a duty to refer,
then the legal profession must develop and control specialization in order
that competent legal specialists can be identified by the general practition-
ers. 
6 7
"designation" or "identification" (self-designation) programs. Id. For a description of Florida's
designation plan and New Mexico's identification plan, see note 67 infra. Three states (Kentucky,
Ohio, and Oklahoma) had adopted "combination" (certification and designation) plans. Addition-
ally, two states (Indiana and Tennessee) had implemented specialization programs based on the ABA
Model Plan.
Even in those states that have implemented designation or identification plans, there is little assur-
ance that the attorneys who have designated or identified the areas in which they practice are actually
competent in those areas. See note 67 infra.
64. An attorney in a state without officially recognized specialization could consult the American
Bar Association (ABA) Directory to find the names of individuals in leadership positions in the
ABA's taxation section. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION 1980/81 DI-
RECTORY E-127-34 (1980). Participation in the taxation section, however, is based on payment of
dues, political considerations, and mutual interests. Participation is not based on certification and
qualification.
65. See generally note 6 and accompanying text supra.
66. California did not implement its board certification program for lawyers until 1973. Stan-
dards for Specification Announced, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 80, 80 (1973). The requirements for qualifying
as a specialist under the certification program include: required period of law practice, substantial
involvement in the specialty area, examination, peer rating, and continuing legal education. See Ko-
vacs, New Standards Set for Certification and Recertification of Legal Specialists, 50 CAL. ST. B.J.
309 (1975); Rules and Regulations of the California Board of Legal Specialization January 1974. 49
CAL. ST. B.J. 170 (1974).
67. The American Bar Association began studying specialization in 1952, and in 1953 the Com-
mittee on Continuing Specialized Legal Education "acknowledged the necessity for regulating vol-
untary specialization. Because of vigorous opposition, the subject was dropped." Fromson, Let's Be
Realistic About Specialization, 63 A.B.A.J. 74, 75 (1977).
A new committee, the Special Committee on Recognition and Certification of Specialization in
Law Practice, was formed but, following opposition to the Committee's proposal for basic criteria,
their proposal was "shelved." Id. In 1967 the Committee concluded that "recognition and regulation
of specialization . . . will measurably improve the availability of legal services .. " Id. Al-
though the ABA's House of Delegates did not support this conclusion, another committee was cre-
ated by the Board of Governors to develop a specialization plan. This Committee on Specialization
encouraged states to develop pilot programs in 1969, but in 1974 the Committee reversed itself and
urged states to refrain from implementing pilot programs until the Committee had evaluated the exist-
ing programs. Id.
Three representative pilot programs include: California's "certification" program (see note 66 su-
pra); Florida's "designation" plan; and New Mexico's "identification" program.
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C. Differentiation between "Specialist" and "Generalist" Cases
The third step in the court's analysis should have been a discussion of
how to distinguish a case that should be referred to a specialist from one
that can be handled by a general practitioner. Although the court ac-
knowledged that not every tax case must be referred to a specialist, 68 no
attempt was made to establish guidelines for distinguishing specialist
cases from generalist cases. 69
The starting point for establishing guidelines could have been an exam-
ination of the alternatives available to an attorney who recognizes a lack
of competence to handle a particular matter. In addition to being able to
refer the client to a specialist, the attorney may, with the client's consent,
associate or consult an attorney who does possess the requisite ex-
Under Florida's "designation" plan, which was implemented in 1976, an attorney may designate
the areas of law in which he practices. As originally adopted, there was "little policing by the bar and
few meaningful requirements other than the . . . requisite of ten hours of continuing legal educa-
tion per year after the attorney self-designates." Wells, Certification in Texas: Increasing Lawyer
Competence and Aiding the Public in Lawyer Selecting, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 689, 689 (1978). See
INTEGRATION RULE OFTHE FLORIDA BAR art. XXI, reprinted in 50 FLA. B.J. 11, 41 (September 1976);
By-Laws Under the Integration Rule art. XVII, reprinted in 50 FLA. B.J. 42, 53-56 (September
1976). The plan was subsequently amended to require stricter entry requirements (e.g., continuing
legal education requirement prior to applying for designation). Bylaws Under the Integration Rule
art. XVII, reprinted in 53 FLA. B.J. 51, 60-63 (September 1979). The Florida Bar also has a certifi-
cation plan pending in the Florida Supreme Court. ABA STANDING COMM. ON SPECIALIZATION, INFOR-
MATION BuLt=TI No. 7, at 37 (1980).
A lawyer in Florida may designate the areas in which she practices on her letterheads and profes-
sional cards and in telephone directories and legal lists. Fromson, supra, at 76.
New Mexico adopted an "identification" program in 1973. "[A]n attorney becomes entitled to
listing in the . . . telephone directory, on letterheads and business cards, and in recognized law lists
as a specialist on his assurance to the New Mexico Board that he has spent at least 60 percent of his
time in that field [during the five immediately preceding years]." Id. Additionally, an attorney who
does not qualify under the identification requirements may advertise in telephone directories and legal
lists that his "practice is limited to [field]." Id. (brackets in original).
The New Mexico Bar, as well as the Florida Bar, "indicates to the public that it is not seeking to
measure competence by specialty designations." Id.
The ABA House of Delegates adopted the "Model Plan for Specialization" in 1979, which out-
lines the recommended minimum criteria for states desiring to implement specialization programs.
By April 1980, ten states had proposed adoption of the Model Plan with revisions. (Interview with
George Stephens, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Specialization, by telephone, April 17,
1980).
See generally Petrey, Professional Competence and Legal Specialization, 50 ST. JoI-N's L. REv.
561 (1976); Fromson, The Challenge of Specialization: Professionalism at the Crossroads, N.Y. ST.
B.J. 540 (1976); Bucklin, Change Is Always a Shock: Is There Some Other Reason You Resist Con-
trolling Specialization?, 50 N.D.L. REv. 169 (1973).
68. 97 Cal. App. 3d at 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720 ("Of course, the fact that the specialty exists
does not mean that every tax case must be referred to a specialist. Many tax matters are so generally
known that they can well be handled by general practitioners.").
69. The court merely concluded that Peckham should have referred this case, because he "him-
self acknowledged his need for expert assistance throughout his testimony .. "Id.
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pertise. 70 Another alternative is to conduct the research necessary to han-
dle the client's case proficiently. 71
1. The Need for Self-Appraisal in Determining Whether to Refer
Determining which alternative is appropriate requires an honest self-
appraisal in light of the complexity of the client's legal problem. 72 For
attorneys, appraisal of their own competence is often difficult because of
an ingrained assumption of a capacity for omnicompetence. 73 Lawyers
often assume that given enough time they can resolve any legal matter. 74
Although this assumption is being eroded by the increasing complexity of
70. See note 30 supra (ABA CODE DR 6-101(A)(1) and CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076 (West
Supp. 1980) (Rule 6-101) reproduced). Although the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility apply to disciplinary rather than to malpractice actions, "'any lawyer representing a
client in a malpractice action in a jurisdiction adopting this Code who does not contend that the Code
in fact sets a standard to be applied in malpractice cases will himself probably be demonstrating a lack
of competence." Thode, Canons 6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship, 48 TEx. L. REV. 367.
377 (1970). See generally Wolfram, The Code of Professional Responsibility as a Measure ofAttor-
ney Liability in Civil Litigation, 30 S.C.L. REV. 281 (1979).
71. However, the attorney should not so educate herself if such preparation would result in un-
reasonable delay or expense to her client. Ethical Consideration 6-3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides in pertinent part:
[A] lawyer generally should not accept employment in any area of the law in which he is not
qualified. However, he may accept such employment if in good faith he expects to become
qualified through study and investigation, as long as such preparation would not result in unrea-
sonable delay or expense to his client.
ABA CODE EC 6-3.
72. See Wilkins, Malpractice and the Under-Informed Lawyer or What You Don't Know May
Really Hurt You After All, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 333 (1977).
73. Ingrained assumptions of the omnicompetence of the lawyer may at first make [the need
for legal specialists] difficult for clients to grasp. In medicine the patient who is told by the
general practitioner that he needs the services of a specialist too, will accept this as a mark of the
care of his physician. In law the client given this advice may take it as proof of the incompetence
of his lawyer. The same assumptions of omnicompetence, by lawyers themselves, may for a
time make generalists resent a plan that seems to reflect on their ability to handle their clients'
cases.
Cheatham, supra note 32, at 504. See Houser, supra note 21, at 210 ("The old adage, 'a jack-of-all-
trades but a master of none,' is more applicable to the legal profession, perhaps, than to any other.
The failure of the attorney to recognize his own limitations has been the cause of much fruitful litiga-
tion.").
74. Lawyers .. . continue to muddle through and insist that given enough time they can do
every job well. Would you be willing to pay a doctor to muddle through specialist's jobs as a
part of a general practice, or pay the doctor for "reading up" instead of referring you to a
specialist?
Bucklin, Change Is Always a Shock: Is There Some Other Reason You Resist Controlling Specializa-
tion?, 50 N.D.L. REv. 169, 170 (1973). See also ABA CODE EC 6-3 (reproduced in part in note 71
supra).
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the law, 75 it still persists, 76 and when an attorney performs services be-
yond his competence, the client pays either for the lawyer's learning
-time77 or for the lawyer's mistakes.
Once an attorney has honestly appraised her competence, she should
balance the benefits and risks of continued representation. 78 If a lawyer
assesses her own competence and believes that she can competently per-
form the requisite services without undue delay, expense, or risk to the
client, she should continue to represent the client. If she determines that
the client's problem is beyond her capacity, but that she could perform
the services with assistance, with the client's approval she should "asso-
ciate" or consult another lawyer who possesses the necessary skill and
learning. If the lawyer discovers that continued representation would re-
sult in undue expense or increased risk, she should refer the client to an
attorney whom she reasonably believes can competently resolve the cli-
ent's problem. 79
2. The Need for Expert Testimony in Establishing Liability for Failure
to Refer
Although self-appraisal will better enable the attorney to determine
whether or not to refer a client to a specialist, it will not aid the judge or
jury in determining whether the attorney's actions fell below the requisite
standard of care.
In medical malpractice actions, the plaintiff must introduce expert tes-
timony to establish the standards of practice. 80 The majority rule in legal
75. See Resulting Standard of Care, supra note 28, at 737. See generally Schnidman & Salzler,
supra note 29, at 548; Bucklin, supra note 74, at 169. One legal scholar has stated:
All of the immense and continuing developments in other fields of knowledge may be of impor-
tance and find reflection in law. They have made law so diverse in subject and so developed in
detail that no lawyer can have an adequate working or even beginning knowledge of the law on
all the matters that may naturally come into the office of the general practitioner.
Cheatham, supra note 32, at 498.
76. See Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
77. A lawyer today cannot "acquire an adequate working knowledge of the law on all [diverse
subjects] in a length of time that will make practicable fees which are fair both to the client and to the
lawyer." Cheatham, supra note 32, at 498. See generally ABA CODE EC 6-3 (reproduced in part in
note 71 supra).
78. Cf. Hirsh, Duty to Consult and Refer, 1977 LEGAL MEDIcINE ANNUAL 249, 249-50 (guide-
lines for physicians).
79. See ABA CODE EC 6-3 (reproduced in part in note 71 supra).
80. The standard of care against which the acts of a physician are to be measured is a matter
peculiarly within the knowledge of experts; it presents the basic issue in a malpractice action and
can only be proved by their testimony, unless the conduct required by particular circumstances is
within the common knowledge of the layman.
Sinz v. Owens, 33 Cal. 2d 749, 205 P.2d 3, 5 (1949) (citations omitted). See Canterbury v. Spence,
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malpractice actions, however, is to admit, but not require, expert testi-
mony by other attorneys on the applicable standard of care in order to
establish a prima facie case. 81
Without the aid of expert testimony, it is unclear how a jury of laymen
can determine whether a reasonably prudent legal general practitioner
would have referred the matter to a specialist under similar circum-
stances. 82 Moreover, even if the jury is able to determine that the attorney
failed to perform her duty to refer, it is not discernible how the jury is to
determine whether the attorney exercised the skill and diligence ordinar-
ily displayed by specialists in that area. 83
Thus, a plaintiff in a legal malpractice action based on negligent failure
to refer should be required first to introduce expert testimony by general
practitioners to establish that the reasonably prudent generalist would
have referred the matter to a specialist. Then the plaintiff should be re-
quired to produce expert testimony by a legal specialist to establish the
standard of care of the reasonably prudent specialist.
Under this approach, the lawyer would be found liable only if the jury
determined (1) that she had failed to fulfill a duty to refer and (2) that in
undertaking to perform the specialist services she failed to exercise the
care and skill ordinarily displayed by specialists. 84
464 F.2d 772, 791-92 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 (al. 3d
229, 236, 502 P.2d 1, 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 509 (1972); Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wn. 2d 476.
478,438 P.2d 829, 831 (1968).
81. See, e.g., Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378 S.W.2d 655,661-62 (1964); Starr v. Moosl in,
14 Cal. App. 3d 988, 997-99, 92 Cal. Rptr. 583, 587-88 (1971) (overruling Gambert v. Hart. 44
Cal. 542 (1872)); Cochrane v. Little, 71 Md. 323, 18 A. 698, 701 (1889). See generally Standard of
Care, supra note 21, at 779; Student Symposium, supra note 18, at 15-16 ("In cases where no expert
evidence need be introduced, judges apparently rely on their own expertise to establish the standard
of care and to advise the jury on the amount of deviation needed to incur liability. The court's own
knowledge is considered as sufficient as expert testimony." 1d. at 16). But see Doff v. Relies. 355
F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying Illinois law); Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 200 (1975) (expert testimony required to define standard of care of maritime specialist);
Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 237 S.E.2d 107, 111 (1978); Brown v. Gitlin, 19 111. App. 3d
1018, 313 N.E.2d 180, 182 (1974); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112-13 (Iowa 1975); Walters
v. Hastings, 84 N.M. 101, 500 P.2d 186, 192 (1972) (contract case, not malpractice; expert testi-
mony still required).
82. See Standard of Care, supra note 21, at 780:
It is not discernible how a jury of laymen, without the aid of such testimony, could determine
whether an attorney had exercised the care of the average member of his profession. In view of
the complexity of law and of legal practice, the confusion would be great in many cases ... if
the jury were permitted to rely solely upon its own knowledge and experiences.





The significance of Horne v. Peckham lies not in the malpractice liabil-
ity of one attorney for failing to refer his client to a tax specialist. Rather,
it is significant in view of its implications for the entire legal profession.
If attorneys are to be held to a standard of care that includes a specific
duty to refer, the profession must meet its obligation by developing and
controlling specialization so that general practitioners can identify com-
petent legal specialists.
Karen J. Feyerherm
